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COMMENT 
Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management 
District: 
Can Environmental Impact Analysis Preserve 
Sustainable Development From the New 
Reach of the Supreme Court’s Exactions 
Jurisprudence? 
PATRICK F. CARROLL* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States Supreme Court has raised the legal 
standard for a municipality to use land use exactions for 
sustainable development.  Land use exactions frequent local 
government affairs and occur when a government demands a 
dedication of land or money in exchange for a municipal approval, 
such as a permit.1  Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management 
 
* Patrick Carroll grew up in the Hudson Valley and is continuously inspired 
by the natural beauty of its local environment. He graduated from the State 
University of New York College of Environmental Science and Forestry where 
he received a Bachelor of Science in Environmental Studies. Currently, Patrick 
is a legal intern with the Pace Environmental Litigation Clinic, and upon his 
graduation from Pace Law School this spring, he will be working with the 
Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial 
Department, as an Appellate Court Attorney. Patrick believes combating 
human-induced global climate change and its attendant environmental injuries 
is the most significant legal and policy challenge of our time.  He hopes to 
combine his passions for the environment and the law as an environmental 
lawyer and play a role toward its resolution. 
1. W. Andrew Gowder, Jr., Recent Developments in Exactions and Impact 
Fees: Public Dedications Required of Private Land, 44 URB. LAW. 667, 676 (2012) 
(discussing what constitutes a land use exaction). 
1
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District2 found certain proposed government exactions for land 
use permits as “demands” on the applicant3 and required a 
“‘nexus’ and ‘rough proportionality’ between the property that the 
government demands and the social costs of the applicant’s 
proposal,” regardless of whether the exaction was a condition 
precedent or a condition subsequent.4  Even without incurring a 
“takings” for purposes of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the United States Constitution,5 if government-imposed 
exactions are found to be “[e]xtortionate demand[s],”6 this would 
still “run afoul of the Takings Clause not because they take 
property but because they impermissibly burden the right not to 
have property taken without just compensation.”7  Thus, if there 
is no “essential nexus” and “rough proportionality,” the exaction 
is an actionable “unconstitutional condition.”8  After Koontz, this 
standard now applies even if an applicant has only been asked to 
make payments to improve public land.9  However, this comment 
argues that municipalities can use environmental impact review 
to shield themselves from the threat of uncertain, broad, and 
costly litigation during negotiations with developers. 
Part II of this paper discusses the import of municipal 
exactions to environmental stewardship and sustainable 
development. Part III provides an overview of the 
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, which played a decisive 
role in the Koontz case.  Part IV centers around the majority and 
dissenting opinions in Koontz, as well as the issues settled, and 
those now raised, by the Court’s ruling.  Part V analyzes the New 
York State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) and 
focuses on its procedural and substantive requirements.  
 
 2. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013). 
 3. Id. at 2598. 
 4. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2595 (citing Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 
391 (1994) and Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987)). 
 5. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 6. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2586. 
 7. Id. at 2586. 
 8. Id. at 2596 (“As in other unconstitutional conditions cases in which 
someone refuses to cede a constitutional right in the face of coercive pressure, 
the impermissible denial of a governmental benefit is a constitutionally 
cognizable injury.”). 
 9. Id. at 2598. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss1/7
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Comparative treatment is also given to the environmental review 
statutes in the States of California and Washington.  Part VI 
concentrates on case illustrations that reveal how these statutes 
satisfy the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, as extended by 
Koontz.  This Part focuses chiefly on SEQRA, but also explores 
possible outcomes under its analogous state counterparts.  Part 
VII concludes with potential ramifications for local environmental 
law and sustainable development. 
II. EXACTIONS IN MUNICIPAL GOVERNANCE 
AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
A. Exactions in General 
Land use exactions frequent municipal governance and occur 
if the government demands an action, such as a dedication of land 
or a payment of money, in exchange for an authorized approval.10  
Exactions can help municipal governments attain certain 
development strategies.  For example, a municipality might not 
have enough revenue to furnish necessary amenities to its 
citizens without asking developers to share in the costs of 
providing the services now required by their projects.11  Exactions 
may be imposed in traditional or non-traditional forms, or 
through impact fees.12  Traditional exactions usually require 
developers to dedicate some property upon which the 
development is intended for public facilities, such as a park, or to 
pay an in-lieu-of fee if the site is unsuitable for a land 
 
 10. Gowder, supra note 1, at 676. 
 11. Home Builders Ass’n of Cent. Ariz. v. City of Mesa, 243 P.3d 610, 616-18 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that a cultural facilities impact fee, legislatively 
imposed by the City, was allowable to offset the impact of a subdivider’s 
development, in part because it provided a beneficial use that the City would 
have been unable to render to maintain the “current level of service” due to the 
new development); Twin Lakes Dev. Co. v. Town of Monroe, 801 N.E.2d 821, 823 
(N.Y. 2003) (holding that a recreational fee “in lieu of” a dedication of real 
property to be imposed on certain residential subdivisions could be used to 
improve “existing facilities for active recreation [that were]  severely limited and 
[were] inadequate to accommodate the needs of its residents”). 
 12. JOHN R. NOLON & PATRICIA E. SALKIN, LAND USE IN A NUTSHELL 118-22 
(2006). 
3
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dedication.13  The payment is used solely to bolster the targeted 
amenities.14  The main difference between a traditional exaction 
and a non-traditional exaction is that the non-traditional form 
may apply the benefit exacted to public lands outside the project 
property.15  Each exaction must address a need created by the 
developer’s project and must serve those directly benefiting from 
that project, such as residents in a subdivision.16  An impact fee 
assesses a cost on the project applicant for “off-site improvements 
necessitated as a direct result of the proposed development.”17  
While these fees raise revenue, they are not taxation tools, but, 
due to their “fee” status, are mechanisms to regulate land use.18  
Notably, impact fees can apply to all new developments, while 
traditional and non-traditional exactions are generally imposed 
on subdivisions, and whereas traditional exactions are usually 
limited to funding amenities such as “open space, parks, and 
infrastructure,” impact fees can apply to other improvements.19 
B. Exactions in the Context of Sustainable 
Development 
Modern trends have encouraged sustainable land use 
practices and capital infrastructure.  It is a common practice to 
preserve forests or wooded areas to achieve sustainability 
objectives by ordinances that charge a developer a fee, instead of 
a dedication of land, to support a “tree preservation fund” to 
protect greenspaces.20  “Linkage fees” are also used to support 
public transit systems to lower the vehicle miles traveled by 
personal automobiles and thus, greenhouse gases that contribute 
 
 13. Id. at 119. 
 14. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 277(4)(c) (McKinney 2013); NOLON & SALKIN, supra note 
12, at 119. 
 15. NOLON & SALKIN, supra note 12, at 120. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 121. 
 18. Id. at 120-21. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Carl J. Circo, Should Owners and Developers of Low-Performance 
Buildings Pay Impact or Mitigation Fees to Finance Green Building Incentive 
Programs and Other Sustainable Development Initiatives?, 34 WM. & MARY 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 55, 103 (2009). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss1/7
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to climate change.21  Such fees require a developer to bear a “fair 
share” of the infrastructure costs necessary to support the new 
development.22  Recent offshoots of the impact fee tool include 
mitigation fee programs that require compensation for the 
ecological harms of a development or that subsidize green 
building programs to encourage sustainable design and 
construction.23  The difference between linkage fees and 
mitigation fees is that the former funds necessary capital 
expenditures for community infrastructure, while mitigation fees 
compensate for the social cost of a project through “environmental 
cost accounting” systems.24  This method values the social costs of 
greenhouse gas emissions or waste disposal and charges 
conventional developers that amount to supply funds for 
sustainable initiatives.25  The economic rationale for fee programs 
is akin to that of wetlands mitigation programs already in use.26  
Even if emission reduction objectives, such as energy-efficiency 
improvements, were too costly for a developer, a conventional 
project could continue if the municipality was paid a fee that 
would be used in other sustainable proposals.27  Still, these fees 
would likely be subject to the Unconstitutional Conditions 
Doctrine as expounded by Koontz, which, given the uncertainty in 
the valuation of environmental benefits,28 may make its 
heightened standard difficult to satisfy.29 
III. OVERVIEW OF THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
CONDITIONS DOCTRINE 
The Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, incorporated 
through the Fourteenth Amendment, underlies the 
environmental issues of Koontz.30  It provides, “nor shall private 
 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 102. 
 23. 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. at 104-05. 
 24. Id. at 108. 
 25. Id.  
 26. Id.  
 27. Id. at 110-11. 
 28. Id. at 112. 
 29. See infra Part III. 
 30. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 827. 
5
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property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”31  
The government may not, by law or by permit, compel a person to 
yield a constitutional right, such as “just compensation,” for a 
governmental benefit that is too attenuated from the property in 
question.32  As discussed above, if the government impermissibly 
conditions a governmental benefit on the surrender of a 
constitutional right, this creates a “constitutionally cognizable 
injury.”33  Consequently, the government faces a potential suit for 
monetary damages.34  When a “takings” has occurred, the 
requisite remedy under the Fifth Amendment is “[j]ust 
[c]ompensation.”35  Yet, the Court has refrained from imposing a 
specific mode of relief if no “takings” has occurred.36  Koontz filed 
suit under the laws of the State of Florida,37 where “monetary 
damages” were an appropriate redress for a “final agency action 
[that] is an unreasonable exercise of the state’s police power 
constituting a taking without just compensation.”38  The Court 
believed the applicability of that statute to “an unconstitutional 
conditions claim like the one at issue here [wa]s a question of 
state law that the Florida Supreme Court did not address” and 
thus, the Court declined to resolve it.39 
 
 31. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 32. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385. 
 33. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2596. 
 34. Id. at 2597. 
 35. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. L.A. Cnty., 482 
U.S. 304, 321 (1987) (“[W]here the government’s activities have already worked 
a taking . . . no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the duty to 
provide compensation for the period during which the taking was effective.”). 
 36. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2597 (“In cases where there is an excessive demand 
but no taking, whether money damages are available is not a question of federal 
constitutional law but of the cause of action—whether state or federal—on 
which the landowner relies.”). 
 37. Id. at 2593. 
 38. FLA. STAT. § 373.617(2) (2013). 
 39. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2598 (“But we need not decide whether federal law 
authorizes plaintiffs to recover damages for unconstitutional conditions claims 
predicated on the Takings Clause because petitioner brought his claim under 
state law. Florida law allows property owners to sue for damages whenever a 
state agency’s action is an unreasonable exercise of the state’s police power 
constituting a taking without just compensation. Whether that provision covers 
an unconstitutional conditions claim like the one at issue here is a question of 
state law that the Florida Supreme Court did not address and on which we will 
not opine.” (emphases retained) (internal citations and quotations omitted)). See 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss1/7
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A. General Formation of the Law Pre-Koontz 
This legal subject has been defined by several Supreme Court 
decisions, but the two most significant cases are Nollan v. 
California Coastal Commission, and Dolan v. City of Tigard.40  
Nollan held that in the absence of an “essential nexus” between a 
condition and the impact to be mitigated, the condition is not a 
valid land use regulation, but is an extortionate demand and a 
“takings.”41  The Dolan case further defined the test such that the 
government must also prove a “rough proportionality” between 
the exaction burdening the property and the impact of the desired 
action by an “individualized determination.”42  The Nollan-Dolan 
test was considered limited to the “special context of [land use] 
exactions.”43  Arguably, this was thought to include only 
dedications of real property, or at least five Supreme Court 
justices supported that proposition.44  Additionally, these 
dedications were thought to arise from adjudicative ad hoc 
demands,45 as by an administrative body, rather than from broad 
generally applicable legislative determinations.46  Koontz must be 
understood against this legal backdrop. 
 
St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, No. SC09–713, 2013 WL 5878147, 
at *1 (Fla. Oct. 30, 2013) (remanding the case to the Fifth District Court of 
Appeal for further proceedings consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision); infra note 95. 
 40. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal 
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 827 (1987). These cases shifted the burden from the 
landowner, as is generally the case for municipal actions under the rational 
basis test, Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394-95 (1926), to 
the government, and they raised the scrutiny required to pass muster. See 
Dolan, 512 U.S. 374; see Nollan, 483 U.S. 825. 
 41. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837. 
 42. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 390-91. 
 43. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 
702 (1999). 
 44. E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 540, 545 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring 
in judgment and dissenting in part); id. at 556 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 45. Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 438 (Cal. 1996) (Nollan-
Dolan heightened scrutiny applies to adjudicatory demands that amount to 
“land use ‘bargains’ . . . in which the local government conditions permit 
approval for a given use on the owner’s surrender of benefits which purportedly 
offset the impact of the proposed development . . . where the individual property 
owner-developer seeks to negotiate approval of a planned development.”). 
 46. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 384-85. 
7
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IV. KOONTZ V. ST. JOHNS RIVER WATER 
MANAGEMENT DISTRICT47 
A. The Majority’s Analysis 
In 1972, Coy Koontz bought a 14.9-acre tract in the State of 
Florida, but he did not seek to develop it until 1994.48  During 
that time, Florida enacted two statutes, the Water Resources Act 
of 1972 and the Warren S. Henderson Wetlands Protection Act, to 
protect state waters.49  The Water Resources Act created water 
districts across the state as well as regional authorities to 
manage them, and required, among other things, that developers 
who wished to “construct . . . in or across the waters of the state” 
to obtain a permit.50  The management authority could “impose 
such reasonable conditions on the permit as [were] necessary to 
assure that construction w[ould] not be harmful to the water 
resources of the district.”51  By 1984, Florida still faced a 
wetlands crisis.52  Thus, it enacted the Warren S. Henderson 
Wetlands Protection Act that required an additional permit to 
“dredge or fill in, on, or over surface waters,” which could be 
obtained by giving “reasonable assurance” that the work was “not 
contrary to the public interest.”53  Consistent with the Wetlands 
Protection Act, St. Johns River Water Management Authority 
(“Authority”) required the creation, preservation, or enhancement 
of wetlands elsewhere to mitigate the impacts of a permitted 
project that developed wetlands in its jurisdiction.54 
Koontz sought to develop 3.7-acres of wetlands, applied for 
the permits, and offered an eleven-acre easement to the 
Authority.55  The Authority suggested he limit development to 
one acre and offer a 13.9-acre easement, or that he deed the 
 
 47. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2586. 
 48. Id. at 2591–92. 
 49. Id. at 2592. 
 50. Id. (citations omitted). 
 51. Id. (citations omitted). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2592 (citations omitted). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 2592–93. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss1/7
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eleven acres, but also pay to improve public wetlands offsite.56  
The offsite condition was not required, as the Authority indicated 
it was open to comparable alternatives.57  Yet, Koontz claimed 
this action was “an unreasonable exercise of the state’s police 
power constituting a taking without just compensation.”58 
The Supreme Court concluded that if a landowner valued a 
permit more than any “just compensation” from a “takings” 
caused by it, governments could force one to surrender this right 
by conditioning permit approval on a transfer of private land for 
public use.59  Still, the Court also stated that land dedications 
were often used to offset environmental costs of development 
otherwise imposed on the public.60  The Court opined the Nollan-
Dolan “nexus” and “rough proportionality” test balanced these 
concerns.61  It turned to the two issues presented: 1) whether 
Nollan-Dolan review applied to both conditions precedent and 
conditions subsequent to permit approval;62 and 2) whether 
monetary exactions were also subject to this heightened 
scrutiny.63 
With little dispute, the Court held that Nollan-Dolan applied 
to permits subject to conditions subsequent or conditions 
precedent.64  It found little difference in the application of the 
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine to cases when the 
government approved a permit, but conditioned it on “the 
applicant turn[ing] over property,” or when it rejected a permit 
“because the applicant refuse[d] to do so.”65  Otherwise, an 
impermissible condition could be imposed by manipulating the 
permit language to state, ‘“denie[s] until’” instead of ‘“approve[s] 
if.’”66 
 
 56. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2593. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 2595.  
 61. Id. 
 62. See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2595. 
 63. See id. at 2596. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 2595. 
 66. Id. at 2596. 
9
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The second holding, however, raised serious questions 
regarding land use permitting.  As in Nollan and Dolan, the 
Court stated that if the government had just demanded the land 
outside the permitting process, it would have been a “takings.”67  
The Authority, the Florida Supreme Court, and four Supreme 
Court Justices, believed an option to pay for improvements, a 
monetary exaction not akin to the dedications in Nollan and 
Dolan, was not subject to “takings” analyses.68  The Koontz 
majority distinguished the dissent’s use of Eastern Enterprises by 
finding the duty to pay at bar “‘operate[d] upon . . . an identified 
property interest’ by directing the owner of a particular piece of 
property to make a monetary payment.”69  Since this fee was tied 
to a “specific parcel,” this “direct link” compelled Nollan-Dolan 
review.70  The Court determined that such demands to improve 
public lands would “transfer an interest in property from the 
landowner to the government” and would entail “a per se taking 
similar to the taking of an easement or a lien.”71 
B. The Dissenting Analysis 
Eastern Enterprises seemed to limit Nollan-Dolan review to 
demands for real property, requiring only a due process analysis 
for monetary exactions.72  Nollan and Dolan were found 
 
 67. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2598–99. 
 68. Id. at 2599. 
 69. Id. at 2599 (citing E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 540 (1998) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part)). 
 70. Id. at 2599–2600. 
 71. Id. at 2600. 
 72. E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 545 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment and 
dissenting in part). Justice Kennedy’s opinion is controlling here since the 
decision resulted in a plurality opinion with him concurring on the narrowest 
grounds in result, but not in rationale. Id. at 539. If “no single rationale 
explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court 
may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the 
judgments on the narrowest grounds.”  Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 
193 (1977) (citations omitted). Justice Kennedy opined that a “takings” analysis 
was improper for exactions that “do[] not operate upon or alter an identified 
property interest” and believed monetary exactions need only satisfy a due 
process analysis. E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 540, 545 (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
judgment and dissenting in part). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss1/7
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applicable only in the “special context of [land use] exactions,”73 
and, before Koontz, appeared limited to administrative agency 
demands for dedications of real property.74  Indeed, there were 
five Justices in Eastern Enterprises who thought an analogous fee 
was a due process issue.75  Arguably, Nollan and Dolan should 
not apply beyond this special niche. 
The dissent would not extend Nollan-Dolan review to 
monetary exactions,76 noting that the government’s action would 
have been a per se “takings” outside the permitting process in 
Nollan and in Dolan.77  Yet, in Eastern Enterprises, Justice 
Kennedy’s controlling opinion found that a broad duty to pay, 
without specifying how it was to be met or upon what property it 
was to be used, was not a “takings.”78  Justice Breyer’s four-
Justice dissent agreed that a demand for a “‘specific interest in 
physical or intellectual property’ or ‘a specific, separately 
identifiable fund of money,’” causes a “takings,” but “‘an ordinary 
liability to pay money’” does not.79  A general condition to pay for 
the repair of public wetlands would seem broad enough to avoid a 
Nollan-Dolan “takings” analysis. The dissent faulted the 
majority’s analogy to a lien, as there was no appropriation of “an 
income stream from a parcel of land,” that affected a “‘specific and 
identified . . . property right,’” since Koontz had broad discretion 
in financing the fee.80 
C. Questions Settled 
Koontz arguably raised more issues than it resolved, but it 
also provided some answers for later land use exaction cases. 
First, municipalities can still impose conditions on land-use 
 
 73. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 
702 (1999). 
 74. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384–85 (1994). 
 75. E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 558 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 76. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2603 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 77. Id. at 2605 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 78. Id. at 2603. 
 79. Id. at 2605 (quoting E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 554–55 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting)). 
 80. Id. at 2606 (quoting E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 540 (Kennedy, J., concurring 
in judgment and dissenting in part)). 
11
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permits; Nollan-Dolan review extends to more of them, now 
applying to conditions subsequent and conditions precedent.81  
Second, government demands for fees to be used for public 
benefit, from any source, cannot be conditionally imposed by 
permit unless the Nollan-Dolan test is met.82  Third, while the 
prior standard for monetary exactions was met because the 
challenger proved the action to be unreasonable,83 by imposing 
Nollan-Dolan scrutiny, Koontz shifted the burden of satisfying 
this standard to the government.84  Lastly, although it is unclear 
if Koontz extends Nollan-Dolan review to generally applicable 
legislative exactions,85 administrative ad hoc exactions, 
unequivocally, must satisfy the Unconstitutional Conditions 
Doctrine.86 
D. Possible Repercussions 
While these ascertainable outcomes are likely to cause 
unease for municipalities, the decision’s unresolved issues may 
further discourage local officials from pursuing sustainable 
initiatives to mitigate the harm of development projects. Instead, 
localities may simply refrain from allowing a project to move 
forward despite its benefits to the community if properly planned. 
Officials may also find the cost of imposing sustainable exaction 
measures too great in light of the heightened litigation risk, 
thereby missing the opportunity to integrate economic 
development with socially and environmentally beneficial goals. 
 
 81. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2596 (majority opinion). 
 82. Id. at 2600. 
 83. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394–95 (1926) (holding 
zoning laws that are a valid exercise of the police power as constitutional). 
 84. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2599. 
 85. Id. at 2608 (Kagan, J., dissenting). See Powell v. Cnty. of Humboldt, 166 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 747 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (Refraining to reach the trial court’s 
conclusion “that the Nollan/Dolan analysis applies only to discretionary, 
adjudicatory impositions of exaction conditions, not to exactions applied to all 
similarly situated property owners on an identical, nondiscretionary basis by 
legislative enactment.”). 
 86. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2603. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss1/7
7_CARROLL FINAL 8/24/2015  12:08 PM 
348 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  32 
 
1. A “Demand” by Government to Trigger Nollan-
Dolan Review 
Koontz obscured the certainty municipalities rely upon in 
using permit fees for land use regulation.87  While the Court 
found a demand was made upon Koontz, he was never required to 
cede specific property or to engage in specific mitigation.88  The 
Court seemed to assume the Authority’s action created an 
“extortionate demand,” and it declined to suggest how concrete a 
demand must be to trigger Nollan-Dolan review.89  Koontz was 
given options in meeting the permit criteria as well as in his 
choice of funds for the payment, and the Authority was willing to 
discuss comparable projects.90  Arguably, Koontz did not fail to 
comply with an “extortionate demand or condition,” but rather, he 
refused to act at all.91  If similar cases of recalcitrance arise in the 
future, the dissent predicted local entities with “decent lawyer[s]” 
would refuse mitigation guidance if it risks litigation.92  If so, the 
permittee now stands in a greater position to leverage a 
municipality into approving a project notwithstanding its 
attendant ecological or social harms. Instead of mutually 
beneficial negotiations, Koontz, as applied to equivocal conditions, 
may incent outright permit approvals, regardless of the harm or 
benefit likely to stem from the development, to avoid litigation 
costs.93  While Koontz refrained from declaring that monetary 
damages would always be the appropriate relief, since the remedy 
here was to be ascertained from the state or federal cause of 
action underlying the extortionate demand,94 the potential for 
liability is both uncertain in substance and scope. Even if 
monetary damages apply, if there is no actual “takings” the 
 
 87. See  Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2609 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 88. Id. at 2593; cf. Powell v. Cnty. of Humboldt, 166 Cal. Rptr. 3d 747, 750, 
753 (Ct. App. 2014) (finding the County’s action to inform the landowner’s 
“counsel it would not approve the permit application without dedication of the 
overflight easement” amounted to a “final, definitive decision . . . .”); see infra 
note 101. 
 89. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2598. 
 90. Id. at 2611 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 2610. 
 93. Id.  
 94. Id. at 2597 (majority opinion). 
13
7_CARROLL FINAL 8/24/2015  12:08 PM 
2015] KOONTZ V. ST. JOHNS  349 
 
remedy for the unconstitutional condition may prove elusive to 
predict under any existing cause of action, thereby making it too 
risky for a municipal attorney to counsel a client into offering a 
mitigating condition.95 
The point in time in which authorities may be subject to 
Nollan-Dolan review during negotiations was also left 
unsettled.96  Local authorities may be subject to suit early on in 
the process because Koontz was allowed to sue, without giving a 
counter proposal, after he found the initial proposals too 
burdensome.97  The Court also failed to indicate what 
administrative remedies must be exhausted prior to Nollan-
Dolan scrutiny.98  Two Justices on the Florida Supreme Court 
would have held for the Authority since, in their view, Koontz had 
 
 95. On remand, the District Court of Appeal of Florida affirmed the lower 
court’s ruling, holding that the Authority had worked an exactions taking by 
unconstitutionally conditioning the permit and thus, Koontz deserved “just 
compensation.”  St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, No. 5D06-1116, 
2014 WL 1703942, at *1-2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2014). The dissent made 
a significant argument based on the Supreme Court’s distinction between 
situations when a permit is denied but neither property nor money has been 
taken, and when a “taking” is actually incurred: 
Because there was no “taking” compensable under the Fifth 
Amendment in this case, the question remains whether Koontz has a 
damages remedy under section 373.617, Florida Statutes. That 
statute, however, specifies that “damages” are available whenever a 
state agency’s action is an “unreasonable exercise of the state’s police 
power constituting a taking without just compensation.” Unless the 
language of the Florida statute is considered to be broad enough to 
authorize the payment of damages for a “taking without just 
compensation” even though there was no “taking” for Fifth 
Amendment purposes, Koontz simply has no claim . . . In what legal 
universe could a law authorizing damages only for a “taking” also 
provide damages when (as all agree) no taking has occurred? I doubt 
that inside-out, upside-down universe is the State of Florida. 
Certainly, none of the Florida courts in this case suggested that the 
majority’s hypothesized remedy actually exists; rather, the trial and 
appellate courts imposed a damages remedy on the mistaken theory 
that there had been a taking (although of exactly what neither was 
clear). 
Id. at *4-5 (Griffin, J., dissenting). See infra note 99 (discussing the cause of 
action under the Floridian statute). 
 96. See generally Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2610–11 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 97. Id. at 2593 (majority opinion). 
 98. Id. at 2597. 
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not exhausted his administrative remedies.99  However, the U.S. 
Supreme Court declined to “second-guess a State Supreme 
Court’s treatment of its own procedural law.”100  As a practical 
matter, the point at which there is an affirmative imposition of an 
impermissible condition, and an affirmative denial there from, 
may be murky at best, which suggests that even initial municipal 
mitigation guidance could induce the requisite “extortionate 
demand.”101 
 
 99. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 77 So. 3d 1220, 1231–32 
(Fla. 2011) (Polston, J., concurring in result). “[A]n attack on the propriety of 
[an] agency action” should first be pursued in accordance with Chapter 120 of 
the Florida Statutes, before a “takings” action is to brought under Section 
317.617 of the Florida Statutes. Id. Section 317.617(2) requires claims of an 
“unreasonable exercise of the state’s police power constituting a taking without 
just compensation” to be brought before a trial court. FLA. STAT. § 373.617(2) 
(2013). Yet, the Authority argued that while an exaction claim is a takings 
claim, nothing was exacted here, and so it was truly a claim on the merits of the 
permit. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 5 So. 3d 8, 10–11 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2009), decision quashed, 77 So. 3d 1220 (Fla. 2011), rev’d, 133 S. 
Ct. 2586 (2013). When the question is whether the permit was “in accordance 
with existing statutes or rules and based on competent substantial evidence,” 
under Chapter 120, the claimant must follow Florida’s Administrative 
Procedure Act for judicial review, and the claim must be brought “in the 
appellate district.”  FLA. STAT. §§ 373.617(2), 120.68 (2013). Since Koontz 
brought his case before the trial court, it was alleged that he did not follow the 
proper administrative process. Koontz, 5 So. 3d at 10–11. However, the appellate 
district believed the Authority was actually arguing that there could be no 
exaction claim when a “land owner refuses to agree to an improper request from 
the government resulting in the denial of the permit.”  Id. at 11. The appellate 
district, while acknowledging the “ongoing debate” over this position, relied on 
Dolan to illustrate an instance where permit conditions were refused and yet 
the exaction claim was reached. Id. It concluded that Dolan’s dissent addressed 
this stance and so, while not taken up by the majority, it was “implicitly rejected 
by the majority.”  Id. Unfortunately for the Authority, the U.S. Supreme Court, 
while refusing to interpret the intricacies of the Florida statutes, held that if a 
landowner refuses an impermissible condition precedent to the issuance of a 
permit, this has the same exaction effect as a condition subsequent. Koontz, 133 
S. Ct. at 2595–96. Thus, it is not likely that any difference between the 
procedural laws amongst the three States analyzed here, would provide a 
municipal entity, using the same argument as the Authority, with any 
additional support. 
 100. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2597. 
 101. For a recent application of Koontz in this respect, see Powell v. County of 
Humboldt, 166 Cal. Rptr. 3d 747 (Ct. App. 2014). After the County of Humboldt 
required the Powells to dedicate an “overflight” easement over their property as 
a condition to the approval of a building permit, the Powells protested that this 
condition was unconstitutional. Id. The County responded to the Powells’ 
15
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Holding a proposed, but not yet required, condition as a 
“demand,” where the landowner could give alternatives to a 
government’s proposals, seems contrary to the Court’s 
articulation of judicial ripeness for a “takings.”  A unanimous 
Court has held that “a Fifth Amendment claim is premature until 
it is clear that the Government has both taken property and 
denied just compensation.”102  When a plaintiff did “not s[eek] 
‘compensation through the procedures the State ha[d] provided 
for doing so,’” the claim was not ripe.103  Arguably, Koontz’s 
inaction during negotiations was not a good faith effort to comply 
with an authorized permitting process, and it is debatable 
whether his challenge was ripe. Even so, the Koontz Court did not 
address this consideration. Thus, municipalities are left with 
vague impressions as to when the Unconstitutional Conditions 
Doctrine may be applied against them. 
2. The Scope of Application 
Without a clear notion as to the new extent of Nollan-Dolan 
scrutiny, the dissent may be right to conclude this “new rule now 
casts a cloud on every decision by every local government to 
require a person seeking a permit to pay or spend money.”104  
Many local permit fees, often used to mitigate “traffic or 
pollution—or [the] destruction of wetlands,” or to pay for services, 
such as wastewater treatment, must now pass a heightened 
review.105  Even the majority recognized that “internaliz[ing] the 
negative externalities of [landowner] conduct is a hallmark of 
 
counsel, stating that it would not approve the permit without the easement. Id. 
“The Powells took no further administrative action, such as obtaining a denial of 
the application, seeking a variance, or taking an appeal from an adverse ruling 
on the permit or variance application to the County’s board of supervisors 
(“Board”).”  Id. (emphasis added). The Court found that this “correspondence . . . 
sufficiently established a final, definitive decision by the County that no permit 
would be issued without the easement. No more was required to satisfy the 
ripeness requirement. Any doubt on this score was removed by . . . Koontz . . ..”  
Id. 
 102. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 133 S. Ct. 2053, 2062 (2013). 
 103. Id. (citing Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of 
Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985)). 
 104. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2608 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 105. See id. at 2607. 
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responsible land-use policy, and [the Court] ha[s] long sustained 
such regulations against constitutional attack.”106  Thus, the 
dissent offered several limits to Koontz. For instance, Dolan was 
limited to adjudicative decisions as to one parcel and did not 
involve a broad legislative plan.107  Yet, the Court did not decide 
whether Koontz was applicable to adjudicative exactions alone, or 
whether it extended to general legislative fees imposed on entire 
jurisdictions.108 
Justice Thomas had previously declared that “takings” 
analyses should not differ based on whether a decision was 
adjudicative, as by a planning commission, rather than 
legislative, as by a city council.109  While recognizing a split 
amongst the lower courts, he noted several state jurisdictions 
that imposed Nollan-Dolan scrutiny in such cases.110  Still, if the 
issue was directed to the Court, it is likely to hold otherwise as 
the Dolan majority emphasized that its use of the “rough 
proportionality” test was in the context of an adjudication, and 
set this apart from the legislative judgments upheld under the 
state police powers in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty.111 
In addition, the Court denied a writ of certiorari when the 
California Supreme Court held that “monetary exactions [were] 
more like zoning restrictions,” and have been “accorded 
substantial judicial deference.”112  In Ehrlich v. City of Culver 
City, Ehrlich gained approval to develop a “private tennis club 
and recreational facility” and in accordance with this approval, 
the city amended its zoning and general plan ordinances to 
 
 106. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2595 (majority opinion). 
 107. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385. 
 108. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2600 n.2 (“[B]ecause the proposed offsite mitigation 
obligation in this case was tied to a particular parcel of land, this case does not 
implicate the question whether monetary exactions must be tied to a particular 
parcel of land in order to constitute a taking.”). See id. at 2608 (Kagan, J., 
dissenting). 
 109. Parking Ass’n of Ga., Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 515 U.S. 1116, 1118 (1995) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (denying certiorari from a decision where a broadly 
applicable ordinance was a valid use of state police powers). 
 110. Id. at 1117. 
 111. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 n.8 (1994) (citing Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty 
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926)). See also Euclid, 272 U.S. at 387. 
 112. Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 454–55 (Cal. 1996), cert. 
denied, 519 U.S. 929 (1996). 
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accommodate the use.113  However, Ehrlich closed the facility 
several years later and applied for a rezoning and a general plan 
amendment to allow him to build a “condominium complex valued 
at $10 million.”114  After performing a feasibility study, the city 
discovered it did not have the funds to buy and operate the 
facility, but still decided to deny Ehrlich’s application due to the 
“loss of a recreational land use needed by the community.”115  
After several discussions with Ehrlich, the city reconsidered and 
decided to approve his application, but required that he pay 
monetary exactions.116  One fee was “‘for additional [public] 
recreational facilities as directed by the City Council,’” and 
another fee fell under an “‘art in public places’” ordinance to be 
paid into the “city art fund.”117  Ehrlich had contended the fees 
were unconstitutional takings without just compensation.118  A 
plurality opinion resulted however, and a concurrence reasoned 
that “general governmental fees” do not implicate Nollan-Dolan 
review, but under “takings” analyses, require the ad hoc 
determination of whether the imposition was arbitrary under the 
Court’s well-recognized balancing of factors.119  Furthermore, the 
 
 113. Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 433–34. 
 114. Id. at 434. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 434–35. 
 117. Id. at 435. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 457–58. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New 
York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (“In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual 
inquiries, the Court’s decisions have identified several factors that have 
particular significance. The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant 
and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct 
investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant considerations. So, too, 
is the character of the governmental action.”). See also San Remo Hotel L.P. v. 
City & Cnty. of S.F., 41 P.3d 87, 105 (Cal. 2002) (“The ‘sine qua non’ for 
application of Nollan/Dolan scrutiny is thus the ‘discretionary deployment of 
the police power’ in ‘the imposition of land-use conditions in individual cases.’  
Only ‘individualized development fees warrant a type of review akin to the 
conditional conveyances at issue in Nollan and Dolan.’ . . . We decline plaintiffs’ 
invitation to extend heightened takings scrutiny to all development fees, 
adhering instead to the distinction . . . between ad hoc exactions and 
legislatively mandated, formulaic mitigation fees. While legislatively mandated 
fees do present some danger of improper leveraging, such generally applicable 
legislation is subject to the ordinary restraints of the democratic political 
process. . . . Ad hoc individual monetary exactions deserve special judicial 
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Washington Supreme Court, in City of Olympia v. Drebick, cited 
this concurrence in its decision that “legislatively prescribed 
development fees” were not subject to Nollan-Dolan review.120  
While Koontz failed to determine this issue, there is some 
authority to suggest general legislatively imposed fees are not 
subject to Nollan-Dolan review.121 
V. LIMITING THE SCOPE OF KOONTZ FOR 
ACTIONS INVOLVING ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPACT ANALYSIS 
If local officials wish to encourage sustainable 
development,122 it may be necessary to impose remedial 
conditions to mitigate destructive developmental impacts.123  
However, Koontz forces municipal officials to navigate potentially 
litigious posturing to achieve such objectives.124  Thus, a means 
to provide some certainty in the permitting process would likely 
reduce the apprehension felt by engaging such laudable goals. 
Moreover, if such a mechanism could also shield against the 
 
scrutiny mainly because, affecting fewer citizens and evading systematic 
assessment, they are more likely to escape such political controls.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 120. City of Olympia v. Drebick, 126 P.3d 802, 808 (Wash. 2006) (en banc). See 
Alto Eldorado P’ship v. Cnty. of Santa Fe, 634 F.3d 1170, 1178 (10th Cir. 2011) 
(“The developers’ claim in this case does not fall within Nollan and Dolan for 
this reason alone: the regulatory action amounts to a restriction on how the 
developers may use their land should they choose to subdivide it or, in the 
alternative, the imposition of a fee.” (footnote omitted)). 
 121. But see George B. Speir, Will Koontz Mean Big Changes or Business as 
Usual for Real Estate Development in California?, 24 no. 1 MILLER & STARR, 
REAL EST. NEWSALERT, Sept. 2013, at 10-1 (“However, it is not clear whether the 
distinction drawn in Ehrlich between legislatively formulated development 
assessments imposed on a broad class of property owners, which would be 
judged under the lesser rational relationship standard, and exactions imposed 
on a specific project on an individual and discretionary basis, which would be 
subject to heightened judicial scrutiny, is still a legitimate distinction.”). 
 122. Sustainable development has been defined as “development . . . [that is] 
adequate to meet the needs of the present without compromising the needs of 
future generations.”  John R. Nolon, Zoning and Land Use Planning, 36 REAL 
EST. L.J. 351, 355 (2007). Sustainable practices include the present preservation 
of open space to allow future generations to foster from its benefits. Id. 
 123. Id. at 368–70, 373. 
 124. See discussion supra Part III. 
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threat of litigation under the Nollan-Dolan test, the municipal 
exaction would better retain its continued vitality as a tool to 
achieve societal goods. 
At least one possible solution to the uncertainty wrought by 
Koontz exists in the form of the environmental impact review 
process. After a brief overview of several SEQRA provisions, a 
comparison will be made between SEQRA and two similar 
statutes. Several case illustrations will then be presented in 
support of the proposition that environmental impact analyses 
can evince a rough proportionality and essential nexus between 
the exaction and the property burdened. Thus, municipalities 
may be able to use environmental impact review findings as a 
shield from the threat of uncertain, and potentially costly, 
litigation during negotiations with developers. 
In 1970, the federal government passed the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) to require federal agencies that 
engage in “major Federal actions significantly affecting the 
quality of the human environment” to evaluate the environmental 
impacts of their action and its alternatives.125  If a proposed 
action is significant enough, the analysis must include a detailed 
report, known as an environmental impact statement (EIS), early 
on in the decision-making process to address environmental 
considerations.126  About half the states enacted similar state 
environmental review legislation, but only a handful of those 
apply to local government agency actions.127  The New York 
SEQRA, the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), and 
the State of Washington’s State Environmental Policy Act 
(SEPA)128 are among those that govern local agency actions.129  
The U.S. Supreme Court has held NEPA to be a procedural 
 
 125. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (2012). 
 126. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.1 (2014). 
 127. JOHN R. NOLON & PATRICIA E. SALKIN, LAND USE AND SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1109 (8th ed. 2012). 
 128. To be clear, these types of statutes are often referred to as state 
environmental policy acts because they are considered, “mini-NEPAs.”  Dean B. 
Suagee & Patrick A. Parenteau, Fashioning a Comprehensive Environmental 
Review Code for Tribal Governments: Institutions and Processes, 21 AM. INDIAN 
L. REV. 297, 299 (1997). 
 129. NOLON & SALKIN, supra note 127, at 1109. 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss1/7
7_CARROLL FINAL 8/24/2015  12:08 PM 
356 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  32 
 
statute, with little substantive force.130  Where NEPA fails to 
offer substantive means to mitigate development impacts, these 
three state statutes do not.131 
A. New York State’s State Environmental Quality 
Review Act (SEQRA) 
SEQRA’s purpose was to mandate state, regional, and local 
government agencies to engage themselves with the 
environmental issues involved in their decision-making and 
planning activities.132  It requires that “all agencies determine 
whether the actions they directly undertake, fund, or approve 
may have a significant impact on the environment, and, if it is 
determined that the action may have a significant adverse 
impact, prepare or request an [EIS].”133  Moreover, “consistent 
with social, economic and other essential considerations from 
among the reasonable alternatives available, the action [must be] 
one that avoids or minimizes adverse environmental impacts to 
the maximum extent practicable” through mitigation.134  SEQRA 
covers many state and local agencies, due to its broad definition 
of “Agency” as “any state or local agency,” and its definition of 
“local agency” as “any local agency, board, district, commission or 
governing body, including any city, county, and other political 
subdivision of the state.”135 
 
 
 130. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989) 
(“Although these procedures are almost certain to affect the agency’s 
substantive decision, it is now well settled that NEPA itself does not mandate 
particular results, but simply prescribes the necessary process.”). 
 131. Id. at 352 (“There is a fundamental distinction, however, between a 
requirement that mitigation be discussed in sufficient detail to ensure that 
environmental consequences have been fairly evaluated, on the one hand, and a 
substantive requirement that a complete mitigation plan be actually formulated 
and adopted, on the other.”); Philip Michael Ferester, Revitalizing the National 
Environmental Policy Act: Substantive Law Adaptations from NEPA’s Progeny, 
16 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 207, 254 (1992). 
 132. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.1(c) (2014). 
 133. Id. § 617.1(c). 
 134. Id. § 617.11(d)(5). 
 135. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0105(2), (3) (McKinney 2014). 
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1. Procedural Requirements - The Preparation of 
an EIS 
An EIS contains the following sections: 1) the proposed action 
and its environmental circumstances; 2) the short-term and long-
term environmental effects of the action; 3) the expected adverse 
environmental impacts if the proposed action was executed; 4) 
alternatives to that action; 5) irreversible or irretrievable 
resources that would be used or lost if the action was undertaken; 
6) mitigation measures to ameliorate environmental impacts; 7) 
any significant growth-inducing consequences of the action; 8) 
any significant energy demands; and 9) other information 
consistent with SEQRA and its guidelines.136 
This detailed analysis functions to determine whether or not 
the proposed action should be undertaken by “incorporat[ing] the 
consideration of environmental factors into the existing planning, 
review and decision-making processes of state, regional and local 
government agencies at the earliest possible time.”137  Given its 
comprehensive scope, it is no small wonder that the EIS has been 
considered “the heart of SEQRA.”138  Still, SEQRA pervades state 
and local agency decision-making even if there is no significant 
effect on the environment to analyze.139 
The lead agency is “principally responsible for undertaking, 
funding or approving an action[,] . . . for determining whether an 
environmental impact statement is required in connection with 
the action, and for the preparation and filing of the statement if 
one is required.”140  Before determining the environmental 
significance of the action, the lead agency may be required to 
complete an Environmental Assessment Form (EAF), which is “a 
form used by an agency to assist it in determining the 
 
 136. MICHAEL B. GERRARD ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REVIEW IN NEW YORK 
§ 1.03 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 2014), available at LexisNexis. 
 137. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.1(c) (2014). 
 138. Jackson v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 494 N.E.2d 429, 435 (N.Y. 1986). 
 139. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0109(2) (McKinney 2014). This provision 
requires an EIS for all agency actions that “may” have a significant effect on the 
environment, a determination that may require using an EAF. N.Y. COMP. 
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.7(b)(3) (2014). 
 140. Id. § 617.2(u). 
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environmental significance or non-significance of actions.”141  An 
EAF must “describe the proposed action, its location, its purpose 
and its potential impacts on the environment.”142  While an 
exhaustive review of the factors and procedures used in 
developing an EAF are beyond the scope of this paper, a basic 
synopsis will illustrate its importance. 
First, an EAF requires an outline of the specific factual 
circumstances of the proposed action, such as environmental and 
physical site considerations, and the particular aspects of the 
proposed action itself.143  Secondly, this information is used to 
“evaluat[e] the proposed action . . . to ascertain its probable 
environmental effects and consequences.”144  Notably, the model 
EAF was recently revised to consider modern environmental 
concerns of proposed actions, such as greenhouse gas 
emissions,145 and became effective on October 7, 2013.146 
If a lead agency finds “no adverse environmental impacts or 
that the identified adverse environmental impacts will not be 
significant,” no EIS is required, the agency makes a 
determination of no significance, and the SEQRA process 
concludes.147  If the “action may include the potential for at least 
one significant adverse environmental impact,” the lead agency 
makes a determination of significance, closes the environmental 
assessment phase, and begins an EIS.148  Yet, some actions that 
could cause adverse significant impacts may not require a full 
EIS, if appropriately mitigated, as described below.149 
 
 141. Id. § 617.2(m). 
 142. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.7(m). 
 143. GERRARD, ET AL., supra note 136, § 3.04. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Frequently Asked Questions Regarding the SEQR Environmental 
Assessment Forms, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, 
http://www.dec.ny.gov/permits/93240.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2014). 
 147. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.7(a)(2); GERRARD, ET AL., supra 
note 136, § 3.05. 
 148. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.7(a)(1). 
 149. Id. § 617.7(d) (discussing when an action that may cause significant 
adverse environmental impacts may receive a conditioned negative declaration 
due to the imposition of SEQRA mitigation conditions). 
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There are three action varieties that an agency may confront: 
Type I, Type II, and Unlisted actions.150  Type I actions are “more 
likely to require preparation of an EIS than Unlisted actions,”151 
while Type II actions “have been determined not to have a 
significant impact on the environment or are otherwise precluded 
from environmental review under Environmental Conservation 
Law, article 8.”152  Unlisted actions are just that, “all actions not 
identified as a Type I or Type II action [under the SEQRA 
regulations], or, in the case of a particular agency action, not 
identified as a Type I or Type II action in the agency’s own 
[SEQRA] procedures.”153  A conditioned negative declaration 
(CND) is a negative declaration of significance that may be issued 
for an Unlisted action, even if it is likely to cause an adverse 
significant environmental impact, if mitigation conditions ensure 
no such impact will occur.154 
In the context of an adjudicatory hearing, the aforesaid 
process creates a record from which a court assesses the agency 
action under a “substantial evidence” review.155  This standard 
requires there be “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,”156 and if so, 
“the courts may not substitute their judgment for that of the 
agency for it is not their role to ‘weigh the desirability of any 
action or [to] choose among alternatives.’”157  The case law also 
 
 150. Id. § 617.2(ai)-(ak). 
 151. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.4(a). 
 152. Id. § 617.5(a). 
 153. Id. § 617.2(ak). 
 154. Id. § 617.2(h). A CND is applicable to “Unlisted actions” that may have an 
adverse significant environmental impact, but, due to the imposition of 
mitigation measures, no such impact will occur. Id. § 617.2(ak). While this 
substantive measure is laudable, its application is subject to Nollan-Dolan 
review. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. 2586; GERRARD ET AL., supra note 136, § 6.04. Thus, if 
a SEQRA condition does not have a “rough proportionality” and “essential 
nexus” “to the state’s interest in protecting the environment from the threat 
posed by the landowner’s proposed project,” it will likely be declared invalid. Id. 
§ 6.04(3). 
 155. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7803(4) (McKinney 2013); 9 WEINBERG ET AL., N.Y. 
PRACTICE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND REGULATION IN NEW YORK § 4:44 ¶ 13 (2d 
ed. 2013), available at Westlaw. 
 156. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). 
 157. Merson v. McNally, 688 N.E.2d 479, 484 (N.Y. 1997) (quoting Akpan v. 
Koch, 554 N.E.2d 53, 57 (N.Y. 1990)). 
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suggests that agency findings in EAFs may evince the requisite 
proportionality and nexus between the condition and the action’s 
impacts.158  Under a “substantial evidence” standard, such 
findings would be granted deference. 
2. Substantive Requirements 
SEQRA not only mandates a procedural consideration of 
environmental impacts, but it also requires choosing alternative 
actions and mitigation “to the maximum extent practicable, [to] 
minimize or avoid adverse environmental effects, including 
effects revealed in the environmental impact statement 
process.”159  “[U]nlike its Federal counterpart and model, 
[NEPA], . . . SEQRA is not merely a disclosure statute; it ‘imposes 
far more action-forcing or substantive requirements on state and 
local decision makers than NEPA imposes on their federal 
counterparts.’”160  Thus, SEQRA regulations allow agencies to 
“impose substantive conditions” after completing a final EIS or a 
CND to ensure satisfaction of this statutory command.161  
SEQRA independently grants the power to require mitigation as 
a condition of approval that is different in its enabling 
mechanism than the traditional conditioning authority used by 
municipalities under their police powers.162 
 
 158. Twin Lakes Dev. Corp. v. Town of Monroe, 801 N.E.2d 821, 825 (N.Y. 
2003); Grogan v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of E. Hampton, 633 N.Y.S.2d 809, 810 
(App. Div. 1995). 
 159. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0109(1) (McKinney 2014). 
 160. Jackson v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 494 N.E.2d 429, 434 (N.Y. 1986) 
(quoting Philip H. Gitlen, The Substantive Impact of the SEQRA, 46 ALB. L. 
REV. 1241, 1248 (1982)). 
 161. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.3(b) (2014). 
 162. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0109(1), (2)(f); N.Y. TOWN LAW § 
276(4)(e) (McKinney 2013). See also Morse v. Gardiner Planning Bd., 563 
N.Y.S.2d 922 (App. Div. 1990); NOLON & SALKIN, supra note 127, at 1110. 
SEQRA provides that 
[a]gencies shall use all practicable means to realize the policies and 
goals set forth in this article, and shall act and choose alternatives 
which, consistent with social, economic and other essential 
considerations, to the maximum extent practicable, minimize or 
avoid adverse environmental effects, including effects revealed in the 
environmental impact statement process. 
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In addition, the New York Court of Appeals has set forth a 
two-prong test to discern whether a negative declaration has been 
impermissibly conditioned.163  If “the project, as initially 
proposed, might result in the identification of one or more 
‘significant adverse environmental effects’ . . . [and] proposed 
mitigating measures . . . were ‘identified and required by the lead 
agency’ as a condition precedent to the issuance of the negative 
declaration,” then the negative declaration has been 
impermissibly conditioned.164  Importantly, the court elaborated 
on the second prong, finding that the measures must be made as 
“part of an open and deliberative process . . . [such that the] 
mitigating measures could be viewed as part of the ‘give and take’ 
of the application process.”165  The court applied this test in 
Merson v. McNally, where a planning board addressed noise and 
mining activities it deemed significant.166  However, open and 
deliberative discussions with the developer quelled these 
concerns through mitigation conditions.167  The developer 
achieved compliance with the zoning code’s noise provision and 
conformed to the planning board’s stipulation that Saturday 
activities would only entail the sale of materials.168  The 
developer also agreed to the planning board’s proposals for traffic 
mitigation, and adjusted its activities to avoid an 
 
N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0109(1). Moreover, SEQRA also requires that the 
EIS “shall include a detailed statement setting forth . . . mitigation measures 
proposed to minimize the environmental impact.” Id. § 8-0109(2)(f). This 
authority is distinct from municipal police powers that allow a municipality to 
engage in conditional zoning, where the municipality may consent to the 
exercise of its zoning authority, but unilaterally conditioned on the project 
applicant’s agreement to perform reasonable actions designed to protect 
neighboring property owners and the character of the community as a whole 
from the effect of the project. Church v. Town of Islip, 168 N.E.2d 680, 682 (N.Y. 
1960). In fact, unilaterally imposed conditions are deemed impermissible 
mitigation measures under SEQRA, Merson v. McNally, 688 N.E.2d 479, 486 
(N.Y. 1997), and this stance appears congruent with the prohibited use of 
extortionate demands under the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine. See 
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2603. 
 163. Merson, 688 N.E.2d at 484. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 484–85. 
 166. Id. at 485. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
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environmentally sensitive aquifer area.169  The court held that 
since the conditions were not “unilaterally imposed by the lead 
agency, but essentially were adjustments incorporated by the 
project sponsor to mitigate the concerns” of the public and other 
agencies, the negative declaration was not impermissibly 
conditioned.170 
New York courts have recognized that conditions are 
permissible when they are not unilaterally imposed but are 
brought about through open and deliberate processes.171  
Moreover, this view appears consistent with the language in 
Koontz. The Koontz majority believed the Authority imposed 
extortionate demands,172 but declined to offer guidance as to 
when a “demand” might be “indefinite,” leaving that decision to 
the Florida Supreme Court on remand.173  Arguably, conditions 
not “unilaterally imposed by the lead agency, but [that] 
essentially were adjustments incorporated by the project sponsor 
to mitigate the concerns” of the public and the reviewing 
agencies,174 would not be so extortionate as to trigger Nollan-
Dolan review. Thus, monetary exactions akin to those in 
Koontz,175 when requested in an open and deliberative manner, 
supported by environmental impact review materials, public 
 
 169. Merson, 688 N.E.2d at 485–86. 
 170. Id. at 486. 
 171. Thorne v. Millbrook Planning Bd., 920 N.Y.S.2d 369, 371 (App. Div. 
2011), leave to appeal denied, 954 N.E.2d 1182 (N.Y. 2011) (“The modifications 
may not be conditions unilaterally imposed by the lead agency, but adjustments 
incorporated by the project sponsor to mitigate concerns identified by the public 
and the reviewing agencies, and be publicly evaluated prior to the issuance of 
the negative declaration.”); Hoffman v. Town Bd. of Queensbury, 680 N.Y.S.2d 
735, 737 (App. Div. 1998) (holding that where the Town Board took a “hard look” 
at the environmental impacts in compliance with its SEQRA obligations, 
engaged public hearings, and solicited public comment from the community as 
well as  involved agencies, its conditions were part of an open and deliberative 
process and were permissible); Wilkinson v. Planning Bd. of Thompson, 680 
N.Y.S.2d 710, 713 (App. Div. 1998) (holding that since issues arose through the 
impact analysis and subsequent public comment and hearings, the CND was not 
impermissible because the changes were simply adaptations by the applicant to 
the concerns of the community and the reviewing agencies). 
 172. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2603. 
 173. Id. at 2598.  
 174. Merson, 688 N.E.2d at 486. 
 175. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2603.  
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hearings, and input by affected parties and agencies, are more 
likely to pass muster. 
B. Comparison to the States of California and 
Washington 
The California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and 
Washington’s State Environmental Protection Act (SEPA) share 
similar qualities with SEQRA. Each governs the actions of local 
government agencies as well as state agencies.176  Each also 
requires an environmental impact analysis for actions that may 
have a significant effect on the environment,177 an 
Environmental Impact Report (EIR) under CEQA, and the 
familiar EIS under SEPA.178  Moreover, all three statutes have 
substantive requirements that can influence decision-making 
processes above and beyond their procedural mechanisms.179  
However, while SEQRA and CEQA require mitigation measures, 
SEPA only permits their use.180 
Under CEQA, “deferred mitigation measures,” measures 
formulated at a later point in the review process, while usually 
barred, are allowed if they are not “loose or open-ended.”181  This 
prevents applicants from avoiding the statute’s mandate to 
ensure impacts are not significant.182 When mitigation 
“provide[s] for specific actions,” “set forth with . . . particularity,” 
such as a buffer zone “no less than 22 acres” for an animal species 
directly impacted by a project, this is not “loose and open-ended” 
 
 176. NOLON & SALKIN, supra note 127, at 1109. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 
21001(a) (West 2014); WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.060 (2013). Only six state 
environmental review statutes, including California and Washington, govern 
both local government and state actions in the United States. NOLON & SALKIN, 
supra note 127, at 1109. 
 177. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21002.1(a) (West 2014); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW 
§ 8-0109(2) (McKinney 2014); WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.030-43.21C.031 (2013). 
 178. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21002.1(a); WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.031. 
 179. Ferester, supra note 131, at 230–31. 
 180. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21002.1(a); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0109(1); 
WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.060. 
 181. Save Panoche Valley v. San Benito Cnty., 158 Cal. Rptr. 3d 719, 737–38 
(Ct. App. 2013). 
 182. Id. at 738 (citing Rialto Citizens for Responsible Growth v. City of Rialto, 
146 Cal. Rptr. 3d 12 (Ct. App. 2012)). 
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss1/7
7_CARROLL FINAL 8/24/2015  12:08 PM 
364 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  32 
 
and is permissible.183  The language requiring “particularity” and 
“specificity” between a condition and a remedy seems analogous 
to the spirit and rationale of Nollan-Dolan scrutiny, even if the 
terminology is different. 
CEQA also allows for fee-based conditions if there is evidence 
that the fee will incur the necessary mitigation.184  In Save Our 
Peninsula Committee v. Monterey County Board of Supervisors, 
an EIR concluded that a proposed residential development would 
greatly add to traffic and congestion issues.185  The county board 
conditioned approval of the project on the payment of a traffic 
mitigation fee to avoid halting regional development.186  The fee 
was intended for street improvements consistent with a Master 
Plan.187  The Court of Appeal for the Sixth District of California 
reviewed the EIR and found the “traffic impact mitigation fees 
were sufficiently tied to the actual mitigation of the impacts of 
increased traffic[,] . . . the EIR’s discussion of traffic mitigation 
measures was adequate and the Board’s adoption of the 
conditions of approval was supported by the evidence.”188 
Save Our Peninsula Committee indicates that courts will give 
deference to decisions consistent with well-performed EIRs 
supported by requisite evidence.189  Here, the court relied upon 
the record formed by the EIR to find that the fee condition was 
“sufficiently tied” to the development impacts.190  Again, while 
this is not the Nollan-Dolan language as expounded by Koontz, it 
suggests that in determining the relationship between a condition 
and an impact, reliance on the EIR would nevertheless be 
appropriate under the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine. 
The authority of local agencies to condition approvals on 
mitigation measures under SEPA appears more limited. SEPA 
 
 183. Id. 
 184. Save Our Peninsula Comm. v. Monterey Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 104 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 326, 356 (Ct. App. 2001). 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 352–53. 
 187. Id. at 353. 
 188. Id. at 356.  
 189. See id. at 342–43 (“Determinations in an EIR must be upheld if they are 
supported by substantial evidence.” (citing Barthelemy v. Chino Basin Mun. 
Water Dist., 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 688, 694 (Ct. App. 1995))). 
 190. Save Our Peninsula Comm., 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 357. 
29
7_CARROLL FINAL 8/24/2015  12:08 PM 
2015] KOONTZ V. ST. JOHNS  365 
 
provides that an applicable “action may be conditioned only to 
mitigate specific adverse environmental impacts which are 
identified in the environmental documents prepared under this 
chapter.”191  The conditions must also be “based upon policies 
identified by the appropriate governmental authority and 
incorporated into regulations, plans, or codes,” and be “reasonable 
and capable of being accomplished.”192  This language has been 
interpreted quite literally. In Prisk v. City of Poulsbo, the Second 
Division of the Court of Appeals of Washington found there to be 
no environmental policy within the city’s jurisdiction to support a 
fee to be used for park resources as a condition for subdivision 
approval.193  Without an otherwise stated policy within the city 
code, the city could not use SEPA to circumvent the illegitimacy 
of a fee that was deemed an unauthorized tax.194  Yet, without 
even reaching the issue of whether a sufficient policy basis was 
present to support certain proposed conditions, the Washington 
Supreme Court has found it sufficient to affirm the issuance of a 
building permit by relying on an impact analysis, which failed to 
show any need for mitigation.195 
A more recent case indicates some flexibility within SEPA’s 
mitigation provisions. In Brinnon Group v. Jefferson County, 
Jefferson County “enacted an ordinance that amended its 
comprehensive plan to permit the development of a master 
planned resort.”196  The ordinance conditioned approval on thirty 
items.197  The Brinnon Group sued for, among other things, the 
fact that there was no policy basis to support each condition.198  
The Court ruled that SEPA did not require a specific policy in 
support of each condition, but rather it was permissible for the 
 
 191. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.060 (2013). 
 192. Id. 
 193. Prisk v. City of Poulsbo, 732 P.2d 1013, 1018–19 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987). 
 194. Id. 
 195. Levine v. Jefferson Cnty., 807 P.2d 363, 366 (Wash. 1991) (relying on 
Nagatani Bros. v. Skagit Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 739 P.2d 696, 699 (Wash. 1987) 
(“SEPA mandates that [an] action is to be conditioned or denied only on the 
basis of specific, proven significant environmental impacts . . . identified in a 
final or supplemental EIS.”)). 
 196. Brinnon Grp. v. Jefferson Cnty., 245 P.3d 789, 793 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011). 
 197. Id. at 796. 
 198. Id. at 805. 
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county to base its “written conditions on the general SEPA 
policies.”199 
The conditions imposed by local agencies under each statute 
are subject to Koontz. Thus, it is important to determine how 
these laws may reduce the uncertainty wrought by that decision. 
Yet, the differences between the statutes may affect how 
effectively each can shield their respective municipalities, under 
an environmental impact analysis, from Koontz’s implications. 
VI. SATISFYING KOONTZ AND THE 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS DOCTRINE 
THROUGH THE ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW 
PROCESS 
The environmental impact analysis is a means of proving a 
rough proportionality and an essential nexus between an exaction 
and the property burdened. As such, municipalities in some 
jurisdictions may resort to impact reports to shield themselves 
from uncertain and costly litigious posturing by developers in 
negotiations. This should encourage their continued pursuit of 
sustainable development through mitigation conditions as well as 
fees to fund “green” capital infrastructures. The following cases 
illustrate how environmental impact reviews have satisfied the 
Nollan-Dolan test, but also now have bearing on the monetary 
exactions under Koontz. 
A. Sudarsky v. City of New York200 
In Sudarsky, property owners claimed their development was 
unconstitutionally restricted after New York City amended the 
City’s Zoning Resolution and therefore prevented them from 
building their project.201  Plaintiffs sought to develop land located 
in a “Special Transit Land Use District,” which was intended for 
a “Second Avenue subway line.”202  If deemed necessary by the 
 
 199. Id. at 808. 
 200. Sudarsky v. City of New York, 779 F. Supp. 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), aff’d, 
969 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1084 (1993). 
 201. Id. at 291–93. 
 202. Id. at 291. 
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Department of City Planning, the Zoning Resolution required the 
conveyance of a transit easement by landowners developing 
within this District to assist the subway project.203  Plaintiffs 
claimed the Department of City Planning schemed to require a 
transit easement on their property to delay the issuance of a 
building permit until it could rezone the site to make their project 
illegal.204  On the claim that the transit easement conditions 
violated Nollan, the District Court found that the property 
owners’ assertions would require the City “to undertake an 
individualized inquiry such as an environmental impact study to 
determine whether plaintiffs’ proposed development would have 
any effect on street congestion or subway use.”205  The District 
Court found that “the federal constitution does not require the 
City to undertake the type of detailed study that plaintiffs argue 
is necessary,” and found Nollan’s nexus analysis to be satisfied 
through less scrutinizing determinations.206 
This is a notable construction of the “essential nexus” 
element of Nollan-Dolan review. If the requisite nexus can be 
satisfied without an environmental impact review, then it 
suggests the more detailed SEQRA review can protect against 
assertions of the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine grounded 
in the nexus component. The decision also provided foresight into 
the “individualized determination” envisioned by Dolan, and may 
infer that impact analyses can meet the “rough proportionality” 
requirement.207  In addition, here, a federal court interpreted a 
land use decision and its impacts on the applicant. The U.S. 
Supreme Court has stated that “state courts undoubtedly have 
more experience than federal courts . . . in resolving the complex 
factual, technical, and legal questions related to zoning and land-
use regulations.”208  While this statement was made in the 
context of determining the competence of state courts and federal 
courts to hear such issues,209 it acknowledged the well-known 
 
 203. Sudarsky, 779 F. Supp. at 291. 
 204. Id. at 293. 
 205. Id. at 299 (emphasis added). 
 206. Id. (emphasis added). 
 207. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391. 
 208. San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cnty of S.F., 545 U.S. 323, 347 (2005). 
 209. Id. 
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primacy of state law over land use issues. Thus, it was proper for 
Sudarsky to rely on a New York Court of Appeals decision, Jenad, 
Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, “cited approvingly in Nollan v. 
California Coastal Comm’n[,]” to determine if the nexus asserted 
by the City was sufficient.210  The next case affirmatively 
indicates SEQRA’s value in satisfying the “rough proportionality” 
requirement. 
B. Grogan v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Town of East 
Hampton211 
This case directly evinces how the SEQRA process may be 
interpreted to satisfy the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine. A 
negative conservation easement, which limits the grantor’s use of 
the property without providing the grantee any use rights,212 was 
imposed as a condition for the Zoning Board of Appeals to 
approve construction of an addition to a house.213 The import of 
this case was not so much the court’s finding of a rough 
proportionality between the easement and the environmental 
impacts of the project,214 but instead how it used the 
“environmental assessment form prepared by the Town of East 
Hampton Planning Department,” as offering determinative 
evidence to support this conclusion.215  While the petitioners 
argued that a no-develop conservation easement was arbitrary 
and capricious and an unconstitutional taking of its property, the 
Second Judicial Department put great weight on the fact that the 
“[EAF] . . . discusse[d] the specific environmental impacts of the 
proposed construction and the best manner by which to 
ameliorate them.”216  The court concluded that this was evidence 
of “a valid, individualized determination that the easement [wa]s 
 
 210. Sudarsky, 779 F. Supp. at 299. 
 211. Grogan v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of E. Hampton, 633 N.Y.S.2d 809 (App. 
Div. 1995). 
 212. JAMES W. ELY, JR. & JON W. BRUCE, THE LAW OF EASEMENTS & LICENSES IN 
LAND § 12:2 (2014), available at Westlaw. 
 213. Grogan, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 810. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
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an appropriate measure to address the specific environmental 
impacts of the petitioners’ proposal.”217 
Grogan illustrates that a properly completed EAF can suffice 
to show the conditions imposed are connected to the impacts of 
the proposed action and are proportional in scope to meet the 
Nollan-Dolan test. It makes no difference that subsequent 
decisions have held that Grogan should not have applied an 
exactions analysis to a negative conservation easement.218  While 
the New York Court of Appeals has now made clear that the 
Nollan-Dolan inquiry only applies to dedications of real property 
and to fees paid in-lieu-of a dedication,219 the indispensable 
matter is that the Grogan court found it appropriate to defer to 
an EAF to evince an essential nexus and rough proportionality.220 
C. Twin Lakes Development Corp. v. Town of Monroe221 
Twin Lakes indicates that the same deferential treatment to 
municipal decision-making and to the imposition of conditions on 
developers pursuant to impact analyses seen in Grogan, also 
apply to fees in-lieu-of a dedication. Twin Lakes Development 
Corporation applied to the Planning Board of the Town of Monroe 
(Board) for approval to subdivide its property into twenty-two 
residential lots.222  The Board reviewed the application under 
SEQRA and decided to conduct a full-fledged EIS.223  After the 
SEQRA process concluded, the Board adopted a “Resolution of 
Conditional Final Approval” that approved the application, but 
conditioned it on several demands; including payment of a fee for 
community recreational purposes instead of a dedication of land 
for such activities.224  Notably, the resolution cited Town Law 
Section 277 for the authority to require such a condition under 
 
 217. Id. 
 218. Smith v. Town of Mendon, 771 N.Y.S.2d 781, aff’d, 822 N.E.2d 1214 (N.Y. 
2004). 
 219. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. State, 840 N.E.2d 68, 83 (N.Y. 2005). 
 220. Grogan v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of E. Hampton, 633 N.Y.S.2d 809, 810 
(App. Div. 1995). 
 221. Twin Lakes Dev. Corp. v. Town of Monroe, 801 N.E.2d 821 (N.Y. 2003). 
 222. Id. at 822. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. at 822–23. 
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Monroe’s Code.225  Twin Lakes argued the fee did not have a 
rough proportionality to the recreational needs that would be 
created by its residential subdivision.226  The New York Court of 
Appeals disagreed and not only found that the Nollan-Dolan test 
was satisfied, but did so through the Board’s findings in the 
EIS.227  This illustrates that even conditions not arising from 
SEQRA authority can be supported by the SEQRA process. 
Twin Lakes and Grogan suggest that an environmental 
impact review constitutes an “individualized consideration of the 
project’s impact [as] contemplated by Dolan v. City of Tigard.”228  
While Dolan required “[n]o precise mathematical calculation,” it 
obliged “some sort of individualized determination that the 
required dedication [wa]s related both in nature and extent to the 
impact of the proposed development.”229  Other jurisdictions are 
in accord. In City of Olympia v. Drebick, the Washington Supreme 
Court, in evaluating whether Nollan-Dolan review applied to 
legislatively prescribed impact fees, discerned the “individualized 
assessment” as the key analysis in Dolan.230  An environmental 
impact review may very well fit this criterion. 
D. California Environmental Quality Act and State 
Environmental Policy Act 
While SEQRA and its corresponding case law seem to be 
powerful tools for municipalities to bolster themselves against 
Koontz-related arguments in New York, CEQA and SEPA 
represent similar shields to such assertions of Nollan-Dolan 
scrutiny. In California, the conditional approval of a building 
permit, requiring the dedication of land for street realignment in 
a professional office use zone, was invalidated as having no 
 
 225. Id. 
 226. Twin Lakes Dev. Corp., 801 N.E.2d at 823. 
 227. Id. at 825. 
 228. Id.; Grogan v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of E. Hampton, 633 N.Y.S.2d 809, 
810 (App. Div. 1995) (By using the findings in the EAF, the court found “a valid, 
individualized determination that the easement [wa]s an appropriate measure 
to address the specific environmental impacts of the petitioners’ proposal.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 229. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391. 
 230. City of Olympia v. Drebick, 126 P.3d 802, 808 (Wash. 2006) (en banc). 
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essential nexus to the project as a mitigation measure for traffic 
impacts.231  The Court relied on the EIR to find “that the 
conversion of the property would impose no significant traffic 
problems in the area.”232  By negative implication, it may be 
inferred that environmental review materials can be used to 
prove an essential nexus between an exaction and the property 
burdened. Yet, as here, when such necessary factual bases are 
absent from an EIR, this may evince the absence of a nexus as 
well.233 
The “Guidelines for the Implementation of [CEQA]” 
promulgated in the California Code also require that the 
“Contents of [EIRs]” consider and discuss mitigation measures 
under the constitutional principles set by Nollan, Dolan, and 
Ehrlich v. City of Culver City.234  In essence, the Unconstitutional 
Conditions Doctrine was drafted into the regulations. If the EIR 
discusses the “essential nexus” and “rough proportionality” of an 
adjudicative mitigation condition and finds these constitutional 
requirements satisfied in a nexus study, such a decision would 
likely be given deference. An agency approval in an EIR will be 
upheld if “‘supported by substantial evidence in the record.’”235  
Substantial evidence is “enough relevant information and 
reasonable inferences from this information that a fair argument 
can be made to support a conclusion, even though other 
conclusions might also be reached.”236  “[T]he reviewing court 
must resolve reasonable doubts in favor of the administrative 
finding and decision” and must not set aside an EIR mitigation 
decision just because an alternative was just as or even more 
 
 231. Rohn v. City of Visalia, 263 Cal. Rptr. 319, 328 (Ct. App. 1989). 
 232. Rohn, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 328.  
 233. See Levine v. Jefferson Cnty., 807 P.2d 363, 366 (Wash. 1991) (“The draft 
EIS contained only a recommendation for minor traffic changes . . . and 
comments by a neighbor expressing concern about traffic and flood levels.” The 
court found that because “[t]his constituted the complete record upon which the 
denial [of a permit] was based . . . the record d[id] not support attachment of the 
mitigative restrictions.”). 
 234. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15126.4(a)–(b) (2014). 
 235. Laurel Heights Improvement Ass’n v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 764 P.2d 
278, 283 (Cal. 1988) (en banc) (citing CAL. CODE. REGS. tit. 14, § 15091(b) (2014)). 
 236. CAL. CODE. REGS. tit. 14, § 15384(a) (2014). 
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reasonable.237  The court will only disturb an agency decision 
under CEQA if “the agency [did] not proceed[] in a manner 
required by law or if the determination or decision [was] not 
supported by substantial evidence,” under an “abuse of 
discretion” standard of review.238  Thus, if the lead agency can 
prove the condition satisfies Nollan, Dolan, and Ehrlich within 
its nexus study, this result would enjoy vast judicial deference, as 
long as the “nexus” and “rough proportionality” findings are not 
mere fabrications. This offers a strong deterrent to Koontz-type 
confrontations, and may protect local sustainable development 
initiatives if the appropriate studies are properly undertaken.239 
The State of Washington offers additional examples of 
environmental review safeguards. In dicta, a Washington 
appellate court found that requiring access ramps on a freeway to 
remedy a purported increase in traffic as a condition to construct 
and operate a new asphalt plant did not satisfy the Nollan-Dolan 
test.240  The court found this EIS inadequate and thus, the record 
was insufficient to require a condition to mitigate traffic concerns, 
at least without the completion of a supplemental EIS.241  This 
case provides another inverse inference that the record can 
 
 237. Laurel Heights Improvement Ass’n, 764 P.2d at 293 (quoting Topanga 
Ass’n for a Scenic Cmty. v. Cnty. of L.A., 522 P.2d 12, 16 (1974)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 238. Laurel Heights Improvement Ass’n, 764 P.2d at 283 (citing CAL. PUB. RES. 
CODE § 21168.5 (West 2014)). 
 239. As discussed above, Koontz did not address whether Nollan-Dolan review 
applies to generally applicable legislative fees. See supra notes 108, 119-21 and 
accompanying text. This is important for California communities. While 
administrative ad hoc monetary exactions have had to satisfy Nollan-Dolan 
scrutiny since the Ehrlich decision, “most communities have adopted 
development impact fees under the Mitigation Fee Act . . . [such as] across-the-
board fees imposed on virtually all applications for development . . . [or] more 
specialized fees . . . on certain types of development, or development within 
certain geographic areas.” Speir, supra note 121, at 4. “These fees may have 
been adopted as a result of an impact fee analysis which generally meets the 
deferential ‘reasonable relationship’ standard of the Mitigation Fee Act.” Id. 
Thus, if Koontz is interpreted as extending Nollan-Dolan review to general fee 
ordinances, it is probable that some of these legislatively imposed fees will not 
satisfy Nollan-Dolan’s heightened standard “when applied to the specific 
circumstances of a particular property or development project.” Id. 
 240. Kiewit Constr. Grp., Inc. v. Clark Cnty., 920 P.2d 1207, 1209, 1213 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1996). 
 241. Id. at 1209, 1213. 
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support a rough proportionality and an essential nexus by 
reference to environmental impact review procedures and 
documents, as long as they are properly performed. 
Washington’s mitigation fee statute allows “‘voluntary 
agreements with [local governments] that allow a payment in lieu 
of a dedication of land or to mitigate a direct impact that has been 
identified as a consequence of a proposed development, 
subdivision, or plat.’”242  However, it only provides a list of 
requirements for the authorization of a mitigation payment, and 
does not grant the power to impose them.243  The authority to 
require such exactions must have some independent statutory 
origin, and SEPA has been upheld as “one such source.”244  Given 
the statutory synergy between SEPA and the mitigation fee 
statute, it is important that the Nollan-Dolan test be satisfied 
when imposing a mitigation fee even if the harm preexisted the 
project under review.245  Thus, the EIS must make an adequate 
“individualized determination” not only as to the unique harm 
created by the project, but also of how the proposed action 
exaggerates a “preexisting deficiency” for the mitigation payment 
to be properly imposed.246  There is some indication that the 
Washington courts would concur with Merson v. McNally, 
 
 242. City of Fed. Way v. Town & Cnty. Real Estate, LLC, 252 P.3d 382, 398 
n.33 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011) (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 82.02.020 (2013)). 
 243. Id.  
 244. Id. at 396 (citing City of Olympia v. Drebick, 126 P.3d 802 (Wash. 2006) 
(en banc)). 
 245. Id. at 396 (referring to Isla Verde Int’l Holdings, Inc. v. City of Camas, 49 
P.3d 867 (Wash. 2002) (en banc)). In Isla Verde International Holdings, Inc., the 
court upheld a condition to mitigate a deficiency that preexisted the proposed 
development, but also held that the record did not support an open space 
mitigation condition as a necessary requirement to mitigate development 
impacts since there was a “determination of nonsignificance.” Isla Verde Int’l 
Holdings, Inc., 49 P.3d at 878–79. While the court emphasized that the value of 
this determination was “not dispositive” and “should not be overemphasized,” id. 
at 879 n.15, the environmental impact analysis clearly played a role in the 
court’s decision. This is another instance where it could be argued, by negative 
inference, that SEPA findings can connect an impact and a condition, but that 
the absence of such findings, as was the case here, may also indicate no such 
relationship. It should be noted, however, that this case, while alluding to 
“roughly proportional” language, seems to use “reasonably necessary” as its 
standard. Id. at 878–79. 
 246. See City of Fed. Way, 252 P.3d at 399 (interpreting Isla Verde Int’l 
Holdings, Inc., 49 P.3d at 879). 
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regarding mitigation, on the import of “an open and deliberative 
process” towards forming conditions.247  Conditions brought on by 
comments of a concerned agency, as well as correspondences and 
studies by the agency and the project sponsor,248 seemed to be 
part of a review process “to mitigate the concerns” of the public 
and other agencies and not “unilaterally imposed by the lead 
agency” despite the project sponsor’s ultimate disapproval.249 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The value of municipal exactions, either through land 
dedications or a fee in-lieu-of a dedication, cannot be overstated. 
They pervade the governance of land use decisions faced by local 
officials on a daily basis. Moreover, municipalities may use 
mitigation conditions to replace existing conventional 
development strategies and land use patterns with more 
sustainable practices. This may occur in an environmental 
context (i.e. open space preservation or by incentivizing green 
development funds),250 economic context (i.e. traffic fees to 
prevent the deterioration of infrastructure by funding repairs and 
construction),251 and social context (i.e. recreational and cultural 
facilities, or maintenance fees to protect such facilities in 
existence).252 Yet, Koontz’s extension of Nollan-Dolan scrutiny to 
monetary exactions, at least in the context of adjudicative ad hoc 
decisions, as well as the uncertainty wrought by the majority’s 
refusal to delineate the scope of its decision, may discourage such 
tactics. Indeed, the Koontz dissent predicted that the majority 
opinion would impede future land use decisions by stifling 
 
 247. Merson v. McNally, 688 N.E.2d 479, 484-85 (N.Y. 1997). 
 248. City of Fed. Way, 252 P.3d at 386–87. 
 249. Merson, 688 N.E.2d at 486. See City of Fed. Way, 252 P.3d at 387. 
 250. See NOLON & SALKIN, supra note 12, at 118-22; Circo, supra note 20, at 
108. 
 251. City of Fed. Way, 252 P.3d at 386–87; Save Our Peninsula Comm. v. 
Monterey Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 326, 356 (Ct. App. 2001). 
 252. Home Builders Ass’n of Cent. Ariz. v. City of Mesa, 243 P.3d 610, 616, 
618 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010); Twin Lakes Dev. Corp. v. Town of Monroe, 801 N.E.2d 
821, 822–23 (N.Y. 2003). 
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negotiations and, in turn, causing rampant rejections of 
development projects and mitigation guidance alike.253 
The Koontz decision invited many environmental legal 
scholars to consider alternative mechanisms to sustain the 
viability of the land use exaction as a prominent tool for 
municipal land use governance. While this comment has argued 
what it believes to be the strongest of these methods, in light of 
the fact that not every State has enacted such robust mini-NEPA 
statutes, at least two other positions are worth mentioning: the 
“development agreement,”254 and “contingency bargaining.”255  
Nonetheless, this comment emphasizes that the state 
environmental impact review process is a wide-ranging and 
effective tool to protect against some of Koontz’s risks,256 and, 
 
 253. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2610 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 254. Development agreements are contracts negotiated between a municipal 
authority and a developer that authorize the local entity to pursue 
comprehensive planning by requiring improvements beyond what would be 
allowed under its local code, and are statutorily authorized in thirteen states. 
David L. Callies, Land Development Conditions After Koontz v. St. Johns River 
Water Management District: Sic Semper Nexus and Proportionality, in SUPREME 
COURT TAKINGS: A FIRST LOOK AT KOONTZ AND HORNE pt. 5, at 1 (Am. Bar Ass’n 
et al. eds., 2013), available at http://apps.americanbar.org/cle/programs/ 
nosearch/materials/2013/t13sctcm1.pdf. 
 255. In the context of sea-level rise, there has been some acknowledgement 
that “contingency bargaining,” or a form of “negotiated project review,” between 
a developer and a municipal agency that “accommodate [for] disagreements 
about future events,” and which contemplate “future costs” may satisfy or even 
fall outside Koontz’s heightened scrutiny for monetary exactions. John R. Nolon, 
Commentary, Sea Level Rise and the Legacy of Lucas: Planning for an Uncertain 
Future, 66 PLAN. & ENVTL. L. 3, 22 (2014). Negotiated, “open and deliberative,” 
and bilaterally constructed conditions seem to frequent the discussion over what 
is or is not an “impermissible condition,” and infers that conditions produced by 
a negotiated process will be less likely to face challenges under Nollan-Dolan 
review. See Merson v. McNally, 688 N.E.2d 479, 484–86 (N.Y. 1997). 
 256. Other scholars have also suggested that Koontz will influence, and can be 
circumvented by, the environmental review statutes. See Robert H. Freilich & 
Neil M. Popowitz, How Local Governments Can Resolve Koontz’s Prohibitions on 
Ad Hoc Land Use Restrictions, 45 URB. LAW. 971, 985 (2013). Yet, this proposed 
solution relies on the use of “tiering” the environmental review by engaging in a 
large programmatic analysis of several actions that are related in a manner 
contemplated by CEQA. Id. at 986. For example, tiering can be applied to 
certain regional development plans that include “a sustainable communities 
strategy” to mitigate air pollution caused by poor transportation planning. Id. at 
986–87. These strategies are usually exempt from CEQA review or will only 
undergo a restricted analysis. Id. The authors suggest that such a “[l]arge-scale 
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where applicable, should be considered as one of the most 
compelling instruments to preserve this vital function of local 
government. The statutory provisions, corresponding regulations, 
and case law in three states seem to indicate that the 
requirements of some state environmental policy statutes can 
shield against or even satisfy Nollan-Dolan litigation.257  Courts 
often seek to avoid embroiling themselves in public policy 
debates, given that such arguments are held primarily in the 
legislative and executive branches of government. Yet, in a world 
of scarce resources, sustainable development is irrefutably a 
sound policy for our communities, states, and nation to aspire 
towards. In fact, all three aforementioned state statutes evince a 
legislative intent to protect and maintain the environment for 
present and future generations, and to prevent the deterioration 
of limited environmental resources from the effects of societal 
expansion and development.258  This is not a mandate to halt all 
development, but a directive that environmental considerations 
be part of our decision-making due to their great value to human 
civilization. It is logical that when municipal officials follow the 
provisions of these statutes, conditions that develop through an 
“open and deliberative process” envisioned by the sovereign 
legislative authority of the respective states, and that consider 
the environmental, economic, and social impacts of a proposed 
action, would be granted deference. This analysis does not 
propose that municipal authorities are completely immune from 
Nollan-Dolan scrutiny under Koontz. Rather, the contention 
asserted here maintains that the procedural and substantive 
 
regulatory mechanism[]” is sufficiently dissimilar from “demand[s] directly tied 
to . . . particular ownership of a particular piece of land” such that 
municipalities could avoid Koontz altogether. Id. at 988 (footnote omitted). Still, 
these authors concede that “[u]nfortunately . . . courts have determined that 
only certain off-site issues can be deferred to later analysis and not just any 
regional, county or city-wide analysis can be used for future individual project 
EIRs.” 45 URB. LAW. 971, 987. If the environmental review process, and its 
resulting impact statement, can in and of itself indicate the requisite nexus and 
proportionality by way of an “individualized determination,” see supra Part VI, 
there would be no need to side-step challenges grounded in Koontz because the 
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine could be directly satisfied. 
 257. See discussion supra Part V. 
 258. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21000 (West 2014); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW 
§ 8-0103 (McKinney 2014); WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.020 (2013). 
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provisions of these state environmental policy statutes and their 
implementing regulations provide pillars of stabilization to 
ensure local efforts, aggregated over the national sphere, toward 
sustainable development do not collapse. 
 
42http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss1/7
